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In a two sectors dynamic model we analyze the process of tourism development based on the 
accumulation of capital (building of tourism facilities) and the reallocation of land from 
traditional activities to the tourism sector. The model incorporates the conflict between 
occupation of the territory by the tourism facilities, other productive activities and availability 
of cultural, natural and environmental assets that are valued by residents and visitors. We 
characterize the process of tourism development in two settings: the socially optimal solution 
and a situation where the costs of tourism expansion are external to the decision makers, 
where externalities on residents as well as intraindustry externalities are considered. 
Regarding the optimal solution, we show that it is optimal to limit tourism expansion before it 
reaches its maximum capacity even in a context where the economic attractiveness of tourism 
relative to other productive sectors rise continuously. However, in this context and when all 
the costs of tourism development are externalities the only limit to tourism quantitative 
expansion is its maximum capacity determined by the availability of land. Finally, we show 
that excessive environmental degradation from the future generations’ point of view is not a 
problem of discounting the future but rather a problem of externalities that affects negatively 
the current and future generations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays there exists a widely accepted consensus that there are limits to a tourism development based 
on quantitative growth. Obviously, the availability of a fixed amount of land in a tourism resort puts an 
ultimate limit to its carrying capacity. However, it is reasonable to assume that before the full 
occupation of land by tourism facilities other limiting factors will operate. Thus, the continuous growth 
in the number of tourists and the associated urban development, specially in small tourism destinations, 
can give place to costs in the form of congestion of public goods and loss of cultural, natural and 
environmental resources. This costs are not only suffered by the residents but they may also cause a 
negative impact on the tourism attractiveness of the destination, an adverse effect on the willingness to 
pay for tourism services provided in the tourism resort and therefore a fall in the returns to investment 
in the tourism sector. 
In this paper we develop a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy 
where tourism development is characterized as a process of reallocation of land in fixed supply form 
low productivity activities (agriculture, forestry…) to its use in the building of tourism facilities. This 
change in the use of land goes along with investment aimed to the building of lodging and recreational 
tourism facilities. Land in the traditional sector, besides being a direct production factor in this sector, 
contains the cultural, natural and environmental resources of the economy. These resources are not only 
valued by the residents but also have a positive effect on the tourism attractiveness of the resort and on 
the willingness to pay for visiting the tourism destination. We therefore make explicit one of the 
characteristics of tourism development, viz. the urbanization of land. The model allows for the 
discussion about the limits of the quantitative tourism development in terms of three relevant factors: 
dependence of tourism with respect to cultural, natural and environmental assets available in fixed 
supply, the positive valuation of these assets by the residents and relative productivity of tourism with 
respect to other alternative sectors.  
Despite the costs of tourism expansion, in the model tourism development is associated with 
improvements in the standard of living for the residents that are ultimately determined by two factors: 
sectoral change and investment opportunities associated to the tourism sector on the one hand and 
improvements in the price of tourism relative to manufactures on the other hand. While the later has 
already been put forward by Lanza and Pigliaru (1994) this is to our knowledge the first paper that 
considers in a dynamic general equilibrium setting the reallocation of factors from low productivity 
sectors to the tourism sector as a possible explanation for the fast growth of the economies that 
specialize in tourism.   3 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model. Section 3 shows the 
optimal solution. In section 4 we obtain the behavior of the economy when the cost of tourism 
development are external to the decision makers. Section 5 compares the optimal and decentralized 
solution with the green golden rule in order to discuss several issues regarding long-term environmental 
degradation. Section 6 consider the case when the price of tourism relative to manufactures grows 
exogenously driven by international factors and compares the dynamics of land allocation in the 
optimal and decentralized solution. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
2.1. Production 
We consider a region with a limited space that we normalize to one. Land has two alternative 
productive uses. On the one hand, it can be used in a traditional sector (agriculture, farming, forestry). 
On the other hand, land can be combined with physical capital to obtain tourism facilities for lodging 
and recreational purposes. We denote the first type of land LT and the second LNT. 
In the economy there are three sectors. Firstly, production in the traditional sector depends on land 




or, given that LT is the complementary of LNT: 
 
YNT=f(LT)  (1) 
 
where f(LT) and df/dLT are continuous functions in the interval LT∈[0,1] with the following properties: 
 
YNT=0 when LT=1  
dYNT/dLNT>0, d
2YNT/dLNT

















Secondly, a construction sector builds tourism facilities for accommodation and recreational purposes 
using land and investment in physical capital. For simplicity, we consider that both production factors   4 













T  are new units of accommodation capacity that are built in each moment of time.  T L
•
 and I are 
the amount of land and investment needed for providing the tourism facilities associated to those units 
of accommodation capacity, while η and ϕ are fixed parameters. 
Given (2), efficiency requires that: 
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where in (4) we have assumed that T(t=0)=LT(t=0)=0.  
Expression (3) shows the relationship between investment and land in the provision of tourism 
facilities, where η/ϕ  measures the investment per unit of land. According to expression (4), 
accommodation capacity is proportional to the land devoted to tourism facilities. 
 
Finally, a tourism sector supplies accommodation and recreational services using tourism facilities. 
Output of the tourism sector is measured by the number of night stays per unit of time. Assuming that 
night stays is a fixed multiple ϑ of the accommodation capacity, output of the tourism sector is a linear 
function of the land occupied by tourism facilities: 
 
YT=ALT, A=ϑη  (5) 
   5 
Notice that A is the upper limit to the output of the tourism sector, that is, if LT=1 then YT=A. Therefore, 
this parameter can be interpreted as a measure of physical carrying capacity. The number of the night 
stays is a fraction of this carrying capacity determined by the fraction of the space devoted to tourism 
facilities. 
 
2.2. Trade flows 
 
We are interested in a situation where tourism services are provided to foreigners. We assume that the 
economy sells the whole production of both sectors in exchange for an homogeneous good, 
manufactures, that is produced abroad. This imported good is used for consumption and investment and 
it is the numeraire. Moreover, for simplicity we assume that the economy cannot lend or borrow from 
abroad. Given these assumptions, goods markets clearing condition implies: 
 




where TR and NTR stand for tourism and non-tourism revenues and PT and PNT are the prices of tourism 
and non tourism production relative to manufactures, while C is aggregate consumption. 
 
2.3.Hypothesis about prices of final goods and tourism revenues function 
 
We assume that PNT is fixed, that is the economy is small in the international market of this product. 
Without loss of generality we normalize this price to one. 
Regarding the price of the tourism services, our crucial assumption is that the price of the night stay 
depends on the satisfaction of the tourists that visit the resort. The satisfaction of a visitor depends on 
many variables, some are specific to the tourism firm that provides for lodging and recreational services 
and some are common to the whole tourism resort. The model includes two of the first kind of 
characteristics that could be determinants of the satisfaction of visitors, namely capital and land per unit 
of accommodation capacity. However, these ratios are considered exogenous and therefore they play a 
secondary role in the model. Our interest lays on those characteristics that are common to the tourism 
resort and, specifically, on landscape and cultural and environmental assets. Regarding this, we assume 
two hypothesis. Firstly, loss of landscape and cultural and environmental assets reduces the satisfaction 
of the tourists that visit the resort. Secondly, these intangibles can be approximated by the allocation of   6 
land between its alternative uses. Basically we are assuming that the economy is endowed with natural 
and cultural assets with tourism attractiveness and these assets are intrinsically linked with that fraction 
of land devoted to traditional activities. 
Formally our reasoning runs as follows. We define a utility function that measures the satisfaction per 











T is satisfaction of a tourist that receives services from firm i,  ω
i is a vector of those 
characteristics specific to that tourism firm and Ω measures characteristics that are common to the 
whole tourism resort (landscape, cultural and environmental assets, congestion). Given the restrictions 
imposed to the production sector, all the tourism firms are identical and therefore we can drop the index 
i. Let us now define PU as the price a tourist is willing to pay for a unit of satisfaction obtained in the 
resort. We consider that this price is exogenously determined in the international market and it is a price 





Where PT is the price paid per night stay. This function could be interpreted in the following way. In the 
international economy there is a continuum of tourism markets differentiated by their quality and the 
price paid for the tourism services. In each of them the suppliers are price-takers but they can move 
along the quality ladder either due to their own decisions or due to changes in the characteristics of the 
tourism resort where they are located. If we consider that the allocation of land is a good approximation 








                                                 
1 Given that the number of visits to the tourism resort is proportional to LT, the allocation of land could also be a 
good approximation of the degree of congestion. This would reinforce the negative effect of LT on tourists’ 
satisfaction.   7 
 
where we have dropped the vector ω since it is constant through time and we have normalized PU to 
one.  
In the literature we can find several works that justify that the tourism price depends on the allocation of 
land. Firstly, applying the contingent valuation methodology, works as Drake (1992), Pruckner (1995) 
or Drake (1999) show that the willingness to pay for the landscape associated to agricultural land can be 
large. On this base, López et alt. (1994) and Brunstad et alt. (1999) consider the hypothesis that this 
willingness to pay is a function of the amount of land devoted to agricultural activities. Secondly, in the 
tourism field Fleischer and Tsur (2000), applying the travel cost method, show that tourists give a 
positive valuation to agricultural landscape that is of a large magnitude in comparison with the 
agricultural production value. Huybers and Bennet (2000) also measure the willingness to pay of 
tourists for better environmental conditions and lower congestion in the tourism resorts they visit. 
 




We consider that this function is continuous and twice differentiable in the interval LT∈[0,1]. 
 
The occupation of the land by tourism facilities has two opposite effects on tourism revenues. On the 
one hand, a positive quantity effect given the positive relationship between night stays and land 
occupied by tourism facilities and, on the other hand, a negative effect on price due to the loss of 
intangible assets with tourism attractiveness. The relative strength of both effects determines the 
behavior of tourism revenues along a process of tourism development. Regarding this, we can consider 
two interesting scenarios. 




This is the case if the elasticity of the price with respect to LT is below one ∀LT∈[0,1] 
 
In a second interesting scenario the elasticity of the tourism price is increasing with LT in such a way 
that: 
   8 
dTR/dLT>0 if LT∈[0, T L
∧
) 







where  T L
∧
 is a tourism development threshold beyond which tourism expansion leads to a fall in 
tourism revenues. This will be the case if the elasticity of the price is lower than one when LT is below 
that threshold and higher than one when LT is above it.
2 
 





TR d  
TR(LT)>0 ∀LT∈(0,1] 
 
The second condition implies that the intangible assets linked to land used in traditional activities are 
not essential for the resort to have tourism attractiveness since the tourism price is positive even in the 
case when all the land is occupied by tourism facilities. 
 
2.4. Resident’s preferences 
 
We consider that the economy is populated by a single representative agent that gives positive value to 
consumption and those cultural and natural assets that are contained in land devoted to traditional 
activities. His/her instantaneous utility function is: 
 
U=U(C,LNT)  UC>0, UCC<0, ULNT>0, ULNTLNT<0 
 
3. OPTIMAL SOLUTION 
 
Optimal solution results from solving the following problem: 
 
                                                 
2 Tisdell (1987) considers a similar relationship between willingness to pay of tourists and the number of visits on 
the grounds of a combination of bandwagon and congestion effects, where the former would dominate in 
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where (3) and (6) have been considered and ρ is the rate of time preference. 




λ = C U   (9) 
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and the transversality condition is: 
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where θ= -UCCC/UC is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption which is assumed constant. 
 
Expression (11) is the Keynes-Ramsey rule that equates marginal returns to LT (left-hand side) and the 
loss in utility and revenues from the traditional sector that arises from a marginal development of land 
aimed to accommodate tourism facilities (right-hand side). In equilibrium, marginal returns to LT have 
to be larger the larger is the rate of time preference, since the occupation of land by tourism facilities 
requires an investment effort and therefore a delay in consumption. The second and third terms in the 
right hand side measure the proportional change of the marginal utility of consumption,  C C U U /
•
− . If,   10 
for instance, marginal utility of consumption falls through time,
3 the faster is its fall, the lower is the 
value of an increase in consumption capacity due to the expansion of tourism and, therefore, the higher 
the marginal return of LT should be. The fourth term is the loss of revenues from the traditional sector 
due to a marginal transfer of land from that sector to the tourism sector. Finally, tourism expansion 
results in environmental, landscape and cultural losses whose value in terms of consumption is ULNT/UC, 
that is, the last term of the right-hand side. 
 
In the steady state all the variables remain constant. Therefore, and given (7) and (11) in the steady state 
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Proposition 1. In the optimal solution there is a unique steady state where the tourism sector is present 




+ ′ − > ′ ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( R NT vNTR R T  (15) 
If (15) is satisfied, in the steady state C>0 and LT∈(0,1). 
Proof: appendix I 
 
Let us assume that the economy is initially specialized in the traditional sector and condition (15) is 
satisfied. As it is shown in figure 1, there is an initial consumption level, C0, that puts the economy in a 
path that converges to the steady state.
4 This path is characterized by a process of tourism development 
where capital accumulates, land is progressively occupied by tourism facilities and consumption and 
                                                 
3 This is what happens when consumption grows and, if marginal utility of consumption is increasing with LT, 
when the tourism sector expands. As it is shown below, this is what happens in the transitional dynamics of the 
model. 
4 In the appendix I it is shown that the steady state is saddle-path stable.   11 
tourism revenues grow. This process of tourism expansion stops before reaching the physical carrying 
capacity due to three factors: the negative effect of congestion and loss of intangible assets on resident’s 
and tourists’ utility and the increase in marginal returns to land in the traditional sector.  
The expression (15) can be interpreted as a necessary condition for a process of tourism development to 
be socially optimal. That is, for the resident to be interested in the expansion of the tourism sector 
revenues from the initial development of this sector, net of the revenue losses in the traditional sector, 
that is, TR’(0)+NTR’(0), should be high enough; total revenues from the traditional sector when the 
economy is fully specialized in this sector, that is, NTR(0), should be low enough; moreover, the weight 
on resident’s utility of the intangible assets that are linked to land used in the traditional sector, v, as 
well as the rate of time preference, ρ, and investment per unit of land required for the building of 
tourism facilities, η/ϕ should be low enough. Figure 2 shows a case when condition (15) is not satisfied. 
Regarding initial consumption, C(t=0)>C* is not possible, since it implies  0 ) 0 ( < =
•
t LT  and therefore a 
negative value of LT. Any value of C(t=0)<C* would set the economy in a path where C(t)<C* ∀t, 
which is inferior to an alternative feasible path where C(t)=C* ∀t. Therefore, the optimal solution is 
C(t)=C*, LT(t)=0 ∀t, that is, society is not interested in the tourism development. 
 
4. SOLUTION WITH EXTERNALITIES 
 
In a decentralized economy some of the costs associated to the tourism expansion are not considered in 
the decisions about allocation of factors. For instance, lack of well defined property rights on natural, 
environmental and landscape assets implies that, without public intervention, the tourism sector do not 
compensate to the residents for the degradation of those assets linked to the tourism expansion. It is true 
that some of the costs of the tourism development fall on the tourism sector in the form of lower 
tourism attractiveness of the resort and a lower tourism price. However, the tourism price depends on 
the characteristics of the whole tourism resort regarding congestion and quality and abundance of 
intangible assets and therefore, except for the case of perfect coordination in the tourism sector (for 
instance, in the case of a monopoly), the decisions of any of the tourism firms will cause negative 
externalities to the rest of the sector. 
In this section the behavior of the model is explored in a case where the costs associated to the tourism 
expansion are purely external. That is, the agents that take the decisions about the allocation of factors 
do not take into account the negative effects of congestion and the loss of intangible assets neither on 
the resident (externalities on residents) nor on the tourism price (intrasector externalities). 
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and the transversality condition is: 
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Condition (17) is different from (10) since in the former we assume that the effects of a change in the 
use of land on resident’s utility and on the price of a night stay are not considered in the decisions of 
allocation of factors. 
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where (14), (16) and (17) have been considered. The steady state satisfies the following conditions: 
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Proposition 2. In the solution with externalities there is a unique interior steady state if and only if the 
following condition is satisfied: 
 
0 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( > − ′ + ρ
ϕ
η
R NT AP  (21) 
If (21) is satisfied, in the interior steady state C>0, LT∈(0,1). 
Proof: appendix II   13 
 
As it is shown in appendix II, the interior steady state is saddle-path stable and satisfies the 
transversality condition. Depending on the functional form of the tourism revenues function, there 
could exist a second steady state where LT=1. However, this steady state does not satisfy the 
transversality condition. 
As it happens in the optimal solution, if the economy is initially specialized in traditional activities and 
condition (21) is satisfied the economy will follow a path of tourism expansion characterized by the 
progressive occupation of land by the tourism facilities, accumulation of capital and growth in 
consumption and tourism revenues. The condition that ensures that this process of tourism development 
stops before the whole land is occupied by tourism facilities is the assumption that  marginal returns to 
land in the traditional sector goes to infinity when LNT tends to zero. Figure 3 shows the steady state and 
the transitional path for the solution with externalities. 
 
It is easy to show that in the solution with externalities tourism expansion is excessive form the social 
point of view. On the one hand, in the solution with externalities land occupied by tourism facilities 
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where (19) and (20) have been considered. 
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Given that  () () [] ) 1 , 0 ( 0 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( 1 / ∈ ∀ > − + − T T T T T T L L P AL L NTR L TR L v  and that the left hand side of both 
expressions is decreasing with LT it follows that when the economic system do not consider the negative 
external effects of the tourism sector the proportion of land occupied by the tourism facilities as well as 
the accommodation capacity of the tourism resort are excessive from the social welfare point of view. 
What is more, when the costs of the tourism expansion are not internalized it could happen that a 
process of tourism development would take place being it socially suboptimal. This is what happens in 
the model when (21) is satisfied but (15) is not. Figure 4 shows a case of this sort. 
   14 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, DISCOUNTING AND EXTERNALITIES 
 
Many times environmental degradation has been explained by intergenerational conflict. That is, 
present generations, seeking for a high own welfare and disregarding the welfare of future generations 
overexploit natural resources leaving a bequest of degraded environment and low welfare. According to 
this explanation, a high discount factor is to blame for unsustainable development paths.  
We address this question in the context of our model. What we show is that a higher discount factor 
implies higher (not lower) cultural, natural and environmental assets in the long run. This is not to say 
that the economy cannot end up with an excessive degradation of these assets but this will be due to the 
presence of externalities in the process of tourism development. 
To show this, let us firstly calculate the “green” golden rule level. In the context of this model, the 
green golden rule level is the allocation of land that maximizes utility in the long-run (steady state). In 
words of Heal (1998), this is the maximum level of sustainable welfare and it could be interpreted as 
the long-run situation of an economy that would only care for long-term welfare. The green golden rule 
comes from the following problem: 
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that gives the following condition: 
 
[] [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
) 1 (
) ( = + − ′ + ′
−
= Φ T T T T
T
T L NTR L TR L R NT L R T
v
L
L  (23) 
 
The optimal solution and the green golden rule only differ in that in the former the welfare during the 
transition to the steady state is also considered in the economic decisions and, moreover, the future is 
discounted. In the optimal solution the economy ends up with a lower level of LT than the green golden 
rule level. This can be shown if we combine (12) and (13) to get: 
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Given that the right hand of (24) is positive when it is evaluated at the steady state of the optimal 
solution and that Φ’(LT)<0 for the relevant range of values for LT, we can conclude that in the optimal 
solution the economy ends up with a level of LT that is lower than the green golden rule. That is, in this 
model it is not true that environmental degradation is a consequence of disregarding of future 
generations’ welfare since if society would only be worried by long-term welfare it would opt for a 
larger tourism expansion and lower long-term cultural, natural and environmental assets. This is due to 
the fact that tourism expansion and environmental degradation are linked to investment in the provision 
of tourism facilities. Precisely because in the optimal solution the future is discounted, current 
generations are not disposed to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of current consumption that are 
needed to reach the green golden rule. Figure 5 compares the steady state of the optimal solution with 
the green golden rule. 
Contrary to the case of the optimal solution, when the environmental and cultural costs of tourism 
expansion are external to the decision makers the economy can end up in the log-run with a more 
degraded environment than what would follow from the maximization of long-run welfare. This is what 
happens if: 
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Condition that results from the combination of (22) and (23) and where the right hand side is evaluated 
at the green golden rule level.
5 This condition is satisfied for low values of the rate of time preference 
and investment requirements per unit of land. In this situation the solution with externalities is 
dynamically inefficient, that is to say, there are paths that imply higher welfare levels not only in the 
steady state but also during the transitional path and therefore long-term environmental degradation is 
not a symptom of intergenerational conflict but of inefficiencies due to the presence of external costs. 
Figure 6 represents a case where the solution with externalities implies excessive environmental 
degradation from the long-term welfare point of view. 
 
6. CONTINUOUS GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION 
 
As it is set up, the model does not allow for long-run growth based on endogenous factors. On the one 
hand, consistent with a large body of the literature that stresses the existence of a carrying capacity in 
                                                 
5 From (23) it follows that in the the green golden rule AP(LT)+ITN’(LT)=(v/(1-LT))[IT(LT)+INT(LT)]-ALTP’(LT) 
Moreover, AP’(LT)+ITN’’(LT)<0.   16 
the tourism resorts (see for instance Butler, 1980), quantitative growth based on the increase in 
accommodation capacity and the number of visitors is not possible given a limited amount of space
6 
and cultural and environmental assets. On the other hand, the model is constructed in a way that 
qualitative growth, for instance through the increase in capital per unit of accommodation, is not 
possible.
7. Therefore, if we want to analyze the effects of continuous growth in the allocation of land we 
have to rely on exogenous forces. A good candidate is the price of tourism relative to manufactures. 
Thus, in this section we explore the behavior of the model in a situation in which factors exogenous to 
the economy rise this relative price. 
This assumption seems reasonable given several facts observed during the last decades. Specifically, 
since the 50’s international tourism expenditures have experience faster growth than world GDP. At the 
micro level tourism expenditure has increased its share in households’ expenditure in most developed 
countries. This behavior can be related to a broader phenomenon consistent on a shift of expenditure 
shares from manufactures to services. As it is commented by Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997), this 
can be mainly explained by a rise in the price of services relative to manufactures since in real terms the 
change of expenditure shares in manufactures and services is quite small. The increase in this relative 
price can be explained by the combination of two factors. On the one hand, Clark (1957) considers the 
hypothesis that income effects could increase relative demand for services after a threshold of economic 
development has been passed. On the other hand, the higher productivity growth that the manufacturing 
sector has experienced tends to lower the price of manufactures relative to services. Figure 7 shows the 
effects of both explanations for the case of the price of tourism relative to manufactures. On the vertical 
axis there is the international relative price per night stay for a given perceived quality. RD is 
international relative demand tourism/manufactures that shifts to the right due to income effects
8 or 
possible changes in preferences. RS is relative supply tourism/manufactures that shifts to the left due to 
higher productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. The combined effect is an increase in the 
relative price of tourism for a given perceived quality of the tourism product and an increase of the 
share of tourism expenditure in total expenditures.  
Lanza and Pligiaru (1994) set up a model where the international price of tourism relative to 
manufactures rises continuously due to a lower productivity growth in the former sector. In their model 
this relative price is endogenous since the economy specialized in tourism is large in the international 
markets (in fact, it is the sole supplier of tourism). In contrast, in our model the economy is small in the 
sense that variations in its supply of accommodation capacity has a negligible effect on world tourism 
supply. Therefore, what we assume is that the rise in the international tourism price relative to 
                                                 
6 As it is shown in the previous sections, growth stops before reaching the maximum capacity of the resort. 
7 See Gómez, Lozano and Rey-Maquieira (2003) for a model where qualitative growth is allowed. 
8 Crouch (1995, 1996) reports high income elasticity of tourism demand.   17 
manufactures is exogenous from the point of view of the economy. Regarding the price of the output of 
the traditional sector relative to manufactures we continue to assume that it remains constant through 
time.  
Therefore, let us consider the following: 
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τ , g>0  
 
where τ is a parameter whose growth reflects upward pressure on relative price of tourism for any 
perceived quality of tourism services, that is, for any level of LT. 
Therefore, we identify two determinants of the relative price of tourism supplied by the economy. On 
the one hand, several factors that push upwards the price of tourism relative to manufactures and affect 
all the tourism destinations and all the market segments. On the other hand, those factors specific to the 
tourism destination, that is, congestion, landscape and natural and environmental assets that determine 
the satisfaction of a tourist visiting the resort and his/her willingness to pay for tourism services given a 
level of τ. 
In the following we analyze the effect on the allocation of land of the assumption that τ grows 
continuously. Specifically, we would like to answer two questions: 
i.  is it socially optimal to limit the quantitative growth of the tourism sector? 
ii.  when the costs of tourism expansion are external to the decision makers, is there any 
limit to the quantitative growth of the tourism sector? 
 
With such an aim, we calculate the asymptotic steady state value of LT in the optimal solution and in the 
solution with externalities when τ grows continuously. 
 
6.1. Optimal solution 
 
Considering (12) and (13) and inserting the parameter τ, the following condition is satisfied in the 
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The asymptotic value of LT consistent with a τ that tends to infinite is that value that makes the 
denominator of the previous expression equal to zero,
9 that is: 
 
() ) ( 1 ) ( T T T L vTR L L R T = − ′  (27) 
 
From this reasoning we can derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. When the international relative tourism price grows continuously the steady state value 
of LT tends asymptotically to a value  () 1 , 0 ∈ T L . 
Prof.: appendix III 
 
The proposition 3 implies that even when the relative price of tourism and therefore the attractiveness 
of tourism relative to other productive sectors grow continuously, it is socially optimal to limit the 
quantitative expansion of the tourism sector before it reaches its maximum capacity.  
To show the dynamics of tourism development with the new assumption, let us consider expression 
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Remember that this expression is a necessary condition for a process of tourism development to be 
optimal. Therefore, there is a threshold of τ under which it is not socially optimal to develop the tourism 
sector. If τ grows continuously that condition will be satisfied soon or later and from then on the 
economy will experience a non balanced growth path characterized bay an expansion of the tourism 
sector at the expense of the traditional sector. Consumption and accommodation capacity grow but 
                                                 
9 There is no value of LT∈[0,1] for which the numerator is infinite.   19 
while the former grows continuously the later tends asymptotically to a level below the maximum 
capacity. Therefore, we identify two sources of growth in the economy: sectoral change fueled by the 
reallocation of resources from other sectors to the tourism sector and exogenous improvements in the 
terms of trade of the economy. However, in the long-term the former vanishes and the later remains 
alone. Figure 8 shows the behavior of the economy when τ grows continuously. 
Notice that in the determination of  T L  (expression 27), the traditional sector is absent. This is so 
because although this sector do not disappear (the asymptotic value of LNT is positive) its share in the 
production value of the economy tends to zero as τ grows. Condition (27) has an interesting economic 
interpretation if we transform that expression into the following: 
 
() [ ] ()
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where (1-LT) has gone to the right, we have multiplied both sides by τC
-θ(1-LT)
v(1-θ) and we have 
considered that, when τ grows the asymptotic value of consumption is equal to the asymptotic level of 
tourism revenues since investment tends asymptotically to zero and the revenues from the traditional 
sector tend to a constant value. 
The left hand side of (27’) represents the contribution to resident’s utility of an additional unit of 
consumption that comes from a marginal transfer of land to the tourism sector disregarding the loss in 
the output of the traditional sector. The right hand side is the negative impact on resident’s utility due to 
the loss of intangible assets associated to that marginal transfer of land. Expression (27’) therefore 
equates marginal costs and marginal benefits of an increase in the accommodation capacity of the resort 
disregarding the effects on the traditional sector. In summary, even in a context where the economic 
attractiveness of tourism relative to the traditional sector increases continuously, full specialization in 
tourism is not socially optimal, but the preservation of the traditional sector is not based on its direct 
productive contribution but on its role in the preservation of cultural, environmental and natural assets 
that are valued by the residents and are a source of tourism revenues. 
 
6.2. Solution with externalities 
 
From (19) and (20) and inserting the parameter τ, the following condition is satisfied in the steady state 
of the solution with externalities. 
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which, for the interior steady state, implies: 
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Proposition 4. The value of LT in the interior steady state of the solution with externalities tends 
asymptotically to its maximum value, unity, when the relative tourism price grows continuously.  
 























. Moreover, in (28) τ is a monotonous function of LT for LT∈[0,1] since NTR’’(LT)<0 and 






Proposition 4 implies that if the costs of tourism development are not considered by the decision 
makers, a continuous increase in the economic attractiveness of tourism relative to other sectors would 
generate incentives to expand tourism capacity with the only limit of the total availability of land. The 
tourism sector fully crowds-out other productive sectors even if full specialization in tourism is not 
socially optimal and society prefers to preserve part of the land form its occupation by tourism facilities 
not only as a source of amenities for the residents but also as a source of tourism revenues. Figure 9 




In this paper we have constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model of tourism development based 
on the reallocation of land from a low productivity traditional sector to its use in the building of tourism   21 
facilities, where that reallocation is associated to investment efforts to provide for those facilities. 
Tourism expansion allows for increases in consumption capabilities but also implies a loss of cultural, 
natural and environmental assets linked to land used in the traditional sector that are positively valued 
not only by the residents but also by the tourists. 
In this framework, the social optimal solution is obtained. We identify a condition for the tourism 
development to be socially desirable. If this condition is met, the optimal solution implies convergence 
to a steady state where land is only partially occupied by tourism facilities. During the transition to the 
steady state the economy experiences economic growth based on the sectoral change. Tourism 
development stops before reaching its maximum capacity due to the positive valuation of cultural, 
natural and environmental assets by the residents, the negative effect on tourism revenues of the loss of 
those assets and decreasing returns to land in the traditional sector. 
It has also been shown that when the costs of tourism expansion are external to the decision makers, 
tourism development is excessive from the point of view of the residents’ welfare. It could even happen 
that a process of tourism development would take place without it being socially desirable. It is also 
possible to end up in the long-term with an environmental degradation that is not compensated with 
high enough consumption. However, in case this is so, the reason is not a problem of intergenerational 
conflict, since a lower tourism development would increase welfare not only in the steady state but also 
during the transitional path, but rather the fact that the costs of tourism development are not fully 
internalized. 
Finally, we consider an exogenous growth factor, that is, the increase in the price of tourism relative to 
manufactures in the international markets. In this context, the economic attractiveness of tourism 
relative to the traditional sector grows continuously but the society is interested in preserving the later 
not because it makes a significant contribution to income but because land used in this sector contains 
the cultural, natural and environmental assets that are valued by the residents and have a positive 
influence on tourism revenues. However, if the costs of tourism expansion are not considered in the 
decisions of factors allocation the traditional sector and those intangible assets that are linked to this 
sector tend to disappear asymptotically. 
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APPENDIX I. Steady state and stability in the optimal solution 
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where (I.1) comes from the combination of (12) and (13) and (I.2) is the same as (13) 
First of all we show that if (15) is satisfied, there exists at least one steady state where C>0, 0<LT<1. To 
prove existence, given continuity in LT∈[0,1] of all functions, the following is enough: 
a) CII>0 ∀LT∈[0,1]. 
b) If (15) is satisfied, then CI>CII for LT=0. 
c) There is an LT =LT*∈(0,1) for which CI=0. Given (I.1), LT* satisfies: 
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There is only one level of LT that satisfies this condition since: (i) Ω(0)>0 if (15) is satisfied; (ii) Ω(1)<0 
given the properties of the traditional sector production function; (iii) Ω’(LT)<0 in the unit interval 
given the assumption about the second derivatives of the tourism revenues function and the traditional 
sector production function. Therefore, CI and CII intersect at least once in the interval LT∈(0,1). 
Secondly, it can be proved that the steady state is unique in the interval LT∈[0,1]. On the one hand, if 
(15) is satisfied then LT≠0 in the steady state. Moreover, given that in the steady state: 
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then LT≠1 in the steady state since when LT=1 the left hand side is minus infinite and the right hand side 
is plus infinite. 
On the other hand, given that CII>0  ∀LT∈(0,1),  CI>0  ∀LT∈(0,LT*) and CI<0  ∀LT∈(LT*,1), then 
LT∈(0,LT*) in the steady state. For this interval, CI is always decreasing in LT and therefore, the steady 
state is unique if CII is increasing in LT for LT∈(0,LT*). Notice that CII has a single maximum in the 
interval LT∈[0,1] since dCII/dLT>0 when LT=0 if (15) is satisfied, dCII/dLT<0 when LT=1 given the   23 
properties of the traditional sector production function and finally d
2CII/dLT
2<0. CII is maximum when 
TR’(LT)+NTR’(LT)=0 while LT* satisfies the condition TR’(LT)+NTR’(LT)=ηρ/ϕ. Since d
2CII/dLT
2<0, the 
value of LT that maximizes CII is larger than LT* and therefore CII is increasing in LT in the interval 
LT∈(0,LT*). 
 
Regarding stability, let us consider the system (7), (11) where in (11) it is assumed that the utility 
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where C  and 
T L  are steady state values. 
 
It is clear that a11>0,  a12<0,  a22<0. If θ≤1 then a21<0. In this case, Det(A)<0 and therefore the 
eigenvalues are real and of opposite signs so the steady state is saddle-path. 
Notice that θ≤1 is a sufficient but not necessary condition for the steady state to be saddle-path. This 
assumption implies that marginal utility of consumption is increasing in LNT. 
 
 
APPENDIX II. Steady state and stability in the solution with externalities 
Conditions (19) and (20) imply: 
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Leaving aside the case when LT=1 for the moment, (II.1) is satisfied if there is a value of LT∈[0,1) for 
which: 
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there is a single value of LT∈[0,1) for which ψ(LT)=0 if: 
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In this steady state consumption is positive since CII>0∀∈[0,1). Moreover, this value of LT is different 
from zero if the previous condition is satisfied as an strict inequality (condition 21). 
Regarding the transversality condition, this can be expressed in the following way: 
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LT tends to a constant value since it belongs to the unit range. Moreover, λ(t=0)<∝, since λ=ηUC/ϕ, 
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In the path that converges to the interior steady state the previous expression converges to zero since in 
the interior steady state the following condition is satisfied: 
   25 
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Therefore, the transversality condition is satisfied. 
In the case a second steady state would exist where LT=1, the path that converges to this steady state do 
not satisfies the transversality condition. In this path NTR’(LT) goes to minus infinite and therefore the 
growth rate of the shadow price tends to infinite. 
Regarding stability, the elements of the Jacobian in the solution with externalities are: 
 















− − ′ ′ + = ) ( ) (
1
1
) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ' 21 T T
T
T T L R NT L R T
L




















Therefore, the determinant is: 
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From which it can be concluded that the interior steady state is a saddle-path. 
 
 
APPENDIX III. Proof of proposition 3 
 
To prove proposition 3 we have firstly to show that there is a single value of LT∈(0,1) that satisfies (27). 
This proof requires a different treatment depending on the hypothesis regarding the behavior of the 
tourism revenues function that have been considered in section 2.3.  
In the case where TR’(LT)>0 ∀LT∈[0,1], the following is sufficient to prove that a single value of 
LT∈(0,1) satisfies (27): 
 
a) when  LT=0 left hand side is larger than right hand side;   26 
b) when  LT=1 left hand side is smaller than right hand side; 
c)  left hand side is decreasing in LT since TR’’(LT)<0 and right hand side is increasing in 
LT for any LT∈[0,1]. 
 
In the alternative case when tourism revenues reach a maximum before reaching maximum tourism 
capacity, we can prove that a single value of LT∈(0,1) satisfies (27) in the following way. Condition 











= −  (III.1) 
 
The right hand side of (III.1) is zero when LT=0, infinite if LT takes the value that maximizes 
tourism revenues, negative if LT is larger than that value and increasing in LT if this variable is below 
that value. Therefore, the level of LT that satisfies (III.1) and (27) is unique and it is strictly between  
zero and one. 
 
We know that if LT tends to the value that satisfies (27), the value of τ in expression (26) goes to 
infinite. The opposite is true, that is, if τ tends to infinite then the steady state level of LT tends to the 
value that satisfies (27) if (26) is monotonically increasing. To show this, we have to prove that 
dτ/dLT>0. To prove this, we differentiate the steady state condition (25), which is equivalent to (26), 
with respect to τ and LT to obtain: 
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where LT takes its steady state value. This expression is always positive since: 
a)  the denominator is positive since when steady state condition (25) is satisfied then: 
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b)  0 ) ( ) ( > ′ + ′ T T L R NT L R T τ , since LT in the steady state of the optimal solution is always 
below the golden rule.  
c)  0 ) ( ) ( < ′ ′ + ′ ′ T T L R NT L R T τ    27 
d)  τTR’(LT)+NTR’(LT)>ηρ/ϕ, since in appendix I it is shown that LT in the steady state of 
the optimal solution is below LT*, where τTR’(LT*)+NTR’(LT*)=ηρ/ϕ and moreover 
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FIGURE 1 















                                                 
10 The following functional forms and parameter values have been used: YNT=B(LNT)
β, PT=PU[(LNT)
α+j], IT=ALTPT, 
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FIGURE 2 















                                                 
11 Same functional forms and parameter values as in figure 1 except for PU. Here PU=0.5 
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FIGURE 3 

















                                                 









0.00 0.17 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.83 1.00  32 
FIGURE 4 
















                                                 
13 Same functional forms and parameter values as in figure 1 except for the productivity parameter of the 
traditional sector. 
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FIGURE 6 
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FIGURE 7 
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FIGURE 8 

















                                                 
14 Same functional forms and parameter values as in figure 1. 
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FIGURE 9 
Steady state in the solution with externalities when τ grows continuously.
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15 Same functional forms and parameter values as in figure 1. 
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